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Abstract— More and more industrial applications require high
reliability, while relying on low-power devices for their flexibility.
Unfortunately, radio transmissions are prone to unreliability, and
are very sensitive to external interference. Therefore, a great
amount of effort has been put on channel hopping approaches,
which help to combat external interference by reducing the
number of packet losses. This approach is combined with a
strict schedule of the transmissions to allow the devices to save
energy. However, some of the radio channels are subjected to
strong interference. Blacklisting techniques identify the interfered
radio channels that demonstrate low packet delivery radio and
avoid using them to transmit data packets. In this article, we
study different distributed and global blacklisting techniques and
investigate their dependencies on the scheduling algorithm. We
also present a new scheme to exploit a blacklist by making the
employed scheduling algorithm blacklist-aware. Our results rely
on a real experimental dataset to quantify the performance of
all these approaches and demonstrate the interest of blacklisting
to improve network reliability.
Index Terms—slow channel hopping; Internet of Things;
Blacklisting; reliability; low-power and lossy networks
I. INTRODUCTION
Smart City applications rely extensively on the Internet
of Things (IoT), requiring network reliability above 99.9%
and guaranteed maximum delay and jitter. For instance, smart
parkings need to collect real time information to provide a
good quality of experience [1].
To fulfill these requirements, the IEEE 802.15.4-TSCH
standard [2] relies on a fixed schedule of transmissions to
enable deterministic communication. A set of cells (timeslot
and channel offset) is allocated to each radio link, denoting
when and through which radio channel the packets have to be
transmitted. By accurately allocating different channel offsets
to interfering links scheduled in the same timeslot, the wireless
network can provide delay and reliability guarantees. The
network maintains a global clock which typically counts the
number of timeslots, i.e., Absolute Sequence Number (ASN),
since the network is bootstrapped.
The level of external interference has been proved to be
high in smart building scenarios, with several co-located
networks [3]. Radio channel hopping enables to combat the
external interference, deriving the frequency to use from the
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Fig. 1: A 5-node topology with a simple TSCH schedule using
dedicated cells for the (unicast) data transmissions.
channel offset and the ASN. Thus, a packet and its retransmis-
sions do not use the same physical frequency, making packet
failures less repetitive.
However, external interference increases the number of
retransmissions. Thus, blacklisting aims to identify the bad
radio channels, which exhibit a low PDR, and to modify the
radio channel hopping sequence accordingly. While routing,
scheduling and blacklisting could be optimized together [4],
the problems are often considered independently due to time
complexity issues.
The assignment of the timeslots and channel offsets can
be achieved by a centralized controller or node by node
distributively in the network. In Fig. 1, a typical schedule
is illustrated: it consists of a matrix of channel offsets and
timeslots (a slotframe), which repeats indefinitely over time.
Certain transmission opportunities are allocated for broadcast
packets (e.g., control packets) in contention-based manner,
where all nodes have to stay awake, while other cells are
allocated per link for unicast packets, in a collision-free
manner.
To cope with unreliable links, the network has to perform
an over-provision of a set of cells for retransmissions. Un-
fortunately, these retransmissions have a negative impact on
end-to-end delay and jitter, and reduce the network capacity.
The contributions of this paper are as follows:
1) We provide experimental results relying on IEEE
802.15.4-TSCH to justify the relevance of blacklisting
for slow channel hopping;
2) We discuss and quantify the assets and limits of imple-
menting a global (common to all the devices) versus
a local (specific to a given radio link) blacklisting
technique;
3) We provide additional open challenges in this research
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Fig. 2: CDF of the ETX value for all the radio links.
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Fig. 3: Heterogeneity in the blacklists.
area.
II. WHY IS BLACKLISTING STILL REQUIRED FOR CHANNEL
HOPPING?
One may argue that radio channel hopping is sufficient
since frequency diversity allows to reduce the number of
repetitive failures. However, not all frequencies exhibit similar
characteristics. In that case, over-provisioning may improve
the end-to-end reliability, but it impacts negatively the energy
consumption and the network capacity. Hereafter, we will
provide experimental results to defend the relevance of black-
listing techniques to avoid these unnecessary retransmissions.
A. Experimental dataset
We focus here on a smart building scenario where a set
of sensors periodically sends measurements to a border router
(aka. Constant Bit Rate flows). For this purpose, we emulate
this scenario on the FIT IoT-LAB platform (https://www.
iot-lab.info/). The experiments rely on IEEE 802.15.4-TSCH
(with the http://openwsn.org open-source implementation),
since it represents a popular industrial standard implementing
a channel hopping approach.
To mimic a smart building environment, we collect a large
dataset of measurements to emulate real link qualities. We
store the packet success / failure for 267 radio links, with one
packet every 3 seconds, during 90 min. The distance between
the transmitter and receivers varies from 0.6 to 17 m [3], [5].
We have co-located WiFi, and other concurrent experiments,
which generate external interference. We inject this dataset
in a custom made Python simulator, to decide if a packet is
received or dropped because of external interference. We focus
here on the efficiency of blacklisting in single hop topologies.
Several techniques have been proposed in the literature to
construct a blacklist with a fixed [6], [7] or variable [5] size.
For the sake of simplicity, we focus here uniquely on fixed-
size blacklists, utilizing the two following strategies:
1) k-Worst Channels: This blacklisting technique ex-
cludes from the channel hopping sequence the k-worst
radio channels with the poorest Packet Delivery Ratio
(smoothed with a WMEWMA estimator [7]).
2) Default: We do not exclude any radio channel from the
channel hopping sequence (equivalent to k=0).
B. Blacklist Efficiency
We first measure the Cumulative Distribution Function
(CDF) of the Expected Transmission Count (ETX) value for
all the links when blacklisting a different number of radio
channels (Fig. 2). The ETX metric counts the average number
of packets to transmit before receiving an acknowledgement.
Without blacklisting (k=0), ETX is high, denoting retransmis-
sions; some radio channels perform badly and impact signif-
icantly reliability. On the contrary, blacklisting automatically
removes the bad radio channels from the frequency hopping
sequence, thus, we need less retransmissions on average.
This improvement has a counter-part: the network capacity is
reduced since the network can only exploit a smaller number
of radio channels.
C. Blacklist changes
In a global blacklist scheme, the controller typically collects
continuously the link quality metric to cope with time-variable
conditions. If the radio channel quality changes significantly,
the blacklist is updated and pushed to all the nodes. Similarly,
per-link blacklists may change if the Packet Delivery Ratio
(PDR) per radio channel evolves. Then, the transmitter has to
notify the receiver of the novel blacklist.
D. Location-based Heterogeneity
We explore the location-dependent characteristics of the
different blacklists, by comparing pair-wisely the blacklists of
different links (see Fig. 3). We use the Hamming Distance,
counting the number of positions where the bits differ for a
pair of binary strings. Here, we associate a 16-bit string to
each link, the ith bit being set to 1 if the radio channel i
is blacklisted. In our case, the Hamming distance counts the
number of radio channels which differ in the two blacklists.
We note that the Hamming distance is an absolute metric. In
particular, two very long blacklists (e.g., 15) can only differ by
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Fig. 4: Taxonomy and Components of the Blacklist Construc-
tion and Exploitation
one radio channel, leading to an Hamming distance at most
equal to 2. However, a global blacklist would be inefficient
even in that case: selecting randomly one pair of radio link,
we have a 90% probability that the best radio channel differs.
Blacklists with 5 radio channels are very different: 50% of
pairs of links share less than one half of the radio channels. In
other words, the blacklist is very location dependent and, thus,
radio links have different blacklists. Consequently, relying on
the same blacklist in the whole network would be suboptimal.
III. BLACKLISTING APPROACHES FOR SLOW CHANNEL
HOPPING
We follow the following steps to exploit a blacklist in
channel hopping networks (Fig. 4):
1) We identify the bad radio channels based on a channel
quality metric;
2) We construct a blacklist which may be global (common
to all nodes) or local (specific to each radio link);
3) We modify the pseudo-random sequence to limit the
usage of the blacklisted radio channels.
We note that the scheduling approach (distributed vs. cen-
tralized) also impacts the way to modify the radio channel
hopping sequence. We will now detail each step of this
process.
A. Identifying bad radio channels
A bad radio channel is a frequency whose usage increases
globally the number of retransmissions and impacts negatively
the network reliability [8]. Thus, a bad radio channel exhibits
a high number of retransmissions compared to the other ones.
Moreover, a bad radio channel may provide a high PDR
for some links while its usage increases globally the number
of retransmissions. Typically, such radio channel should be
removed from the hopping sequence.
Most heuristics identify the radio channels providing a poor
reliability by measuring the average ETX value independently
for each radio channel [7]. Alternatively, more sophisticated
techniques may be implemented to detect the bad radio
channels, measuring the noise floor (which should be on
average higher for bad radio channels), or a spectrum sensing
method [6]. RSSI has been proved to reflect very loosely the
link quality [3].
Alternatively, ETSCH applies a non-intrusive radio channel
quality estimation by performing energy detection during idle
periods of any timeslot [9]. This technique is efficient when
the timeslot duration is sufficient to compensate clock drifts,
while letting enough time for energy detection. Addressing
multi-hop topologies is still an open challenge and dedicated
timeslots for energy detection may be required.
B. Blacklists Construction
1) Global blacklists: Several standards rely on global
blacklisting to avoid using the bad radio channels: a radio
channel which presents poor characteristics in the whole
network is removed from the hopping sequence. Since it corre-
sponds to a global consensus, most of the implementations are
centralized: a controller collects all the statistics and decides
which frequencies to blacklist. Then, the hopping sequence is
typically piggybacked in the periodical beacons to push the
configuration to all the nodes.
Constructing the blacklist corresponds to an optimization
problem. For instance, one may select a blacklist which
minimizes the maximum number of retransmissions for all
the radio links to consider fairness. Alternatively, an heuristic
where the controller blacklists the k radio channels with the
worst PDR allows the network to remove the radio channels
which provide on average a poor reliability.
2) Local blacklists: Alternatively, the devices can locally
decide if a radio channel is bad for a specific radio link.
Most of the approaches propose to blacklist all the radio
channels with a metric below (or above) a given threshold
value. For instance, Du et al. [10] consider the RSSI value of
each radio channel, measured during quiet intervals for which
transmissions are forbidden.
Since the blacklist is constructed locally, the receiver and the
transmitter have to construct a common list of radio channels
to exclude for their transmissions. Otherwise, inconsistent
blacklists would lead to deafness. Du et al. [10] propose
to piggyback the blacklist in the beacons. Unfortunately,
beacons are not acknowledged, and inconsistencies may
still arise. Gomes et al. [11] propose rather to piggyback the
blacklist in the data and ack frames while maintaining a
blacklist sequence number. The transmitter uses the blacklist
that corresponds to the highest sequence number acknowl-
edged by the receiver.
C. Channel Hopping modification
At the beginning of a timeslot, a device verifies in the sched-
ule if it has to stay awake. If the cell is allocated to the device,
the physical frequency to use for transmission/reception is
derived from the ASN of the timeslot and the channel offset
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assigned to this cell. More precisely, it sums the ASN value
and the channel offset assigned to the links, and then applies
a modulo operator to map this integer to a frequency from the
hopping sequence.
Thus, exploiting a blacklist means to modify the frequency
hopping sequence to remove or use less frequently the bad
radio channels. Since very different (and mainly incompatible)
approaches exist in the literature, we detail each of them in
the next section.
IV. EXPLOITING A BLACKLIST: CHANGING THE
FREQUENCY HOPPING SEQUENCE
After having identified the bad radio channels, next we have
to modify the frequency hopping sequence. This modification
may be applied globally for all the nodes and cells. Alterna-
tively, a per-link hopping sequence may be defined. In that
case, it only applies to the dedicated cell, where a specific
receiver is identified.
A. Global common frequency hopping sequence
When the blacklist is global, all devices have to modify
their pseudo-random hopping sequence. It practically means
that each device has to adjust the number of available channel
offsets to contain only the number of non-blacklisted radio
channels so the physical mapping function gives only the good
radio channels.
The blacklist may be piggybacked in the Enhanced Beacons
(EB): a node that joins the network extracts the blacklist from
the EB and constructs accordingly the frequency hopping se-
quence. In adaptive solutions, the blacklist must be updated to
reflect the actual performance of the network. In a centralized
approach, the centralized controller must collect the statistics
for each radio link and then identify the radio channels which
perform badly. The nodes should start using a blacklist only
when all of them received the new version [12]. Otherwise
deafness and even network disconnection may occur.
B. Probabilistic assignment
A device should use more frequently the good radio chan-
nels to reduce the average number of retransmissions. Thus,
the transmitter can remove the bad radio channels from its
frequency hopping sequence. However, collisions may arise in
this case even among two interfering links that use a different
channel offset.
Let us consider the example depicted in Fig. 5 (single offset
case) with the same topology as Fig. 1. Let us assume that
nodes (A, B) (resp. (C, D)) have blacklisted radio channels 13-
15 and 20-23 (resp. 19-23). Given a value of ASN=50, we can
observe that the mapping function will generate the same radio
channel for both nodes and, thus, the corresponding transmis-
sions will collide, i.e., collisions due parallel transmissions.
To make the collisions less repetitive, a device spreads the
load pseudo-randomly on all the good radio channels [5].
The frequency to use depends on the result of the frequency
mapping function:
Good radio channel: the device uses it in the current times-
lot;
Bad radio channel: the device uses a radio channel selected
pseudo-randomly among the good ones. Practically, it
re-applies the frequency mapping function after having
incremented a common variable (ID of the transmitter)
until the result corresponds to a good radio channel.
Sha et al. [13] detail a mechanism to decrease the com-
putation cost for adaptive blacklisting, avoiding to regenerate
from scratch the sequence when the blacklist has changed.
However, both approaches consider single hop topologies,
although avoiding collisions in multi-hop scenarios with a
probabilistic approach is still an open problem.
This probabilistic approach keeps on generating collisions.
While these collisions are not repetitive, they impact the
reliability, particularly with dense networks using long and
heterogeneous blacklists.
C. Multiple channel offsets assignment
The network may allocate one timeslot and several channel
offsets to a given link, such as MABO-TSCH does [11]. The
blacklist can then be negotiated locally, among the transmitter
and the receiver. At the beginning of a timeslot, a node uses
its channel offsets list to derive the frequency to use. More
precisely, if the first channel offset corresponds to a blacklisted
radio channel, it uses the next channel offset in its list. The
process stops when a good radio channel is obtained, or the
last channel offset is scanned.
This method is illustrated in Fig. 5 (multi-offset case). The
link (A, B) received three different channel offsets. The first
channel offset (1) gives a bad radio channel and is not used.
Finally, only the third channel offset corresponds to a good
radio channel, which will be used for the transmission.
This strategy does not create any collision; the channel
offsets are distributed orthogonally (a pair of interfering links
never receives the same channel offset). However, a fixed
(small) number of channel offsets is assigned to each link.
With long blacklists, we will keep on using poor radio chan-
nels, impacting negatively reliability. An adaptive strategy, to
decide on the optimal number of channel offsets to assign per
link, has still to be proposed.
This multi-channel offset scheme supports both centralized
and distributed scheduling algorithms: a link has just to reserve
several channel offsets. However, the detection of collisions
with a distributed scheduling algorithm is more complicated.
Since several channel offsets are used, the collisions will not
occur when two links share one part of the channel offsets.
D. Blacklist-aware assignment
Since this approach has not been studied so far, we propose
here the first blacklist-aware centralized scheduling algo-
rithm. To the classical constraints (half-duplexity, interference,
etc.) [14], we insert a set of constraints to deal with blacklists:
Same blacklist: If two radio links have the same blacklist,
they cannot create collisions if they are allocated in the
same timeslot with different channel offsets. The mapping
function will never give the same result;
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Disjoint whitelist: Whitelists represent the complement of
blacklists. If two radio links use a disjoint whitelist, no
collision can take place by definition.
In all other cases, the scheduling algorithm considers a black-
list conflict and allocates different timeslots to the two links.
The centralized controller needs to know the blacklist of
all the links, which may represent a large overhead. Adaptive
blacklists mean that the schedule has to be probably changed
accordingly, since new blacklisting constraints may arise.
Conflicting links are scheduled in different timeslots, and
the schedule length tends to increase when blacklists are
very different among the nodes. We need to explore how the
centralized controller can also tune the blacklists to reduce
the number of constraints. For instance, a frequency may be
inserted by the centralized controller in a blacklist if it removes
the conflict between a pair of links.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Simulation Methodology
To efficiently mimic a smart building scenario, we have to
construct multi-hop topologies. We generate random topolo-
gies of 40 nodes and one root, randomly positioned in an area
of 200 X 200 m2, the coverage range of each node is 50 m
[14]. The average number of neighbors per node is 6.5. and
the average number of hops is 3.07 (maximum 6).
We then adopt the same methodology as described in
Section II-A to map a simulated link to a link from the dataset.
When a packet is generated, the transmission success / failure
is derived from the dataset with the correct physical frequency
used for the transmission. This way, we are able to emulate
external interference.
A gradient based routing as IPv6 Routing Protocol for Low-
Power and Lossy Networks (RPL) is executed, and a node
selects as parent its neighbor closest from the sink. Besides, the
construction of the schedule was carried out using the Traffic
Aware Scheduling Algorithm (TASA) [14]. A node generates
a random number of packets (comprised between [1,5]) at the
beginning of each slotframe. We consider 16 channel offsets
and a slotframe size of 293 timeslots to support all the flows
and their possible retransmissions. We repeat each experiment
for ten different random network topologies.
We measure the following metrics:
• Link-level PDR: Ratio of the number of data packets
delivered by the receiver and the total number of data
packets transmitted by the transmitter;
• Percentage of Collisions due to parallel transmissions:
Ratio of the number of colliding packets due to parallel
transmissions and the total number of transmitted packets
by all the nodes.
B. Evaluation
We compare the following solutions:
• Default: no radio channel is blacklisted;
• Global: each radio link ranks its radio channels according
to their PDR, the rank being its position in the list. We
blacklist globally the k radio channels that provide the
lowest average PDR for all the links;
• Local: to compare fairly the global and local approaches,
we blacklist the k worst radio channels for each radio
link. Then, we implement the following approaches:
– Probabilistic: similar to [5] (section IV-B);
– Multiple: similar to MABO-TSCH [11] (sec-
tion IV-C);
– Blacklist-aware: our proposed centralized blacklist
aware scheduling approach (section IV-D). Since we
let each radio link to continuously update its black-
list dynamically, some collisions may arise among
different channel offsets.
We measure the PDR obtained at the link level (Fig. 6).
The default approach does not use blacklisting and, thus,
many retransmissions occur: only 85% of the packets are ac-
knowledged correctly. The global blacklist improves the packet
delivery ratio, blacklisting the radio channel which performs
the worst for some links. However, long blacklists lead to a
smaller network capacity, since the load has to be spread over
a small number of frequencies. The reliability increases with
longer blacklists for the probabilistic approach: the number of
collisions is negligible; using better radio channels is always
advantageous. On the contrary, the reliability decreases for
the multichannel offset approach: longer blacklists imply that
we have to allocate a very large number of channel offsets
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for each link, decreasing the efficiency. Finally, the blacklist-
aware assignment seems the most efficient, since it adapts the
schedule in a centralized way while tuning the blacklist locally.
VI. OPEN CHALLENGES
We have demonstrated the relevance of using blacklisting to
reduce the number of transmissions, which impact negatively
both the reliability and the energy consumption. However,
there are still certain open issues when exploiting blacklists:
Joint-optimization: Considering the routing, scheduling, and
blacklisting all together may help to improve perfor-
mance. For instance, the scheduling algorithm may decide
to change the blacklist to relax the scheduling constraints.
We have first to investigate theoretically the gap to fill
between a disjoint and a conjoint optimization. Then,
heuristics have to be proposed if this gap is significant;
Capacity reduction: With longer blacklists, the nodes reduce
the usage of bad radio channels and, thus, the number
of retransmissions. However, transmissions have to be
multiplexed through a smaller number of radio channels,
increasing the probability of collisions in dense networks.
An adaptive blacklist size, which optimizes reliability
while respecting a minimum network capacity has still
to be proposed.
Co-located networks: Blacklisting has been designed for ex-
ternal interference using a static set of radio channels.
If other co-located networks adopt a channel hopping
strategy, blacklisting would be inefficient since the load
is spread uniformly across all the radio channels [15]. We
should rather be able to detect interfering networks adopt-
ing the same strategy, for instance with a classification
technique. Then, an heuristic to share the radio spectrum
among the interfering networks shall be proposed.
VII. CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES
A channel hopping based MAC protocol helps to combat
external interference but it is still insufficient. Blacklisting
techniques identify the radio channels which exhibit a poor
reliability and modify the behavior of the link layer to use
mostly the best radio channels. We investigated here the
negative impact of long blacklists on the network capacity,
specifically for global blacklists. We also detailed how the
scheduling algorithm is tightly dependent on the blacklisting
technique.
Centralized scheduling algorithms with a global blacklist
have still to be evaluated under real conditions: obtaining
the statistics (link reliability, amount of packets) in real time
corresponds to a challenging objective. Single channel MAC
also needs to identify the best radio channel to use for the
whole network. A common consensus is here required similar
to a global blacklisting problem. In particular, non-intrusive
channel quality estimation techniques may be re-adapted to
tackle this problematic.
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